

INTERNATIONAL ANALYTICS OF MYROSLAV PROKOP AND MYKHAYLO PALIDOVYCH IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

МІЖНАРОДНА АНАЛІТИКА МИРОСЛАВА ПРОКОПА ТА МИХАЙЛА ПАЛІДОВИЧА У КОНТЕКСТІ ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНИХ ОРІЄНТИРІВ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАЦІОНАЛІЗМУ ЧАСІВ 2-Ї СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ

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The views of the representatives of Ukrainian nationalist political thought M. Prokop (pseudonym V. Sadovi) and M. Palidovych (pseudonym Yu. Moryak) on the analysis of the international situation in different periods of the Second World War are studied. The author assesses the current state and prospects of foreign policy of both the great powers – the leading actors in international relations, and regional ones from the standpoint of potential support for the Ukrainian national liberation movement, made by the above-mentioned theorists. The international analytics of M. Prokop and M. Palidovych are considered in the context of the development of foreign policy orientations of Ukrainian nationalism during the period of the Second World War.

It is stated that M. Prokop and M. Palidovych in their analysis separately identified Germany and the USSR as occupiers, countries with allied obligations to them, while simultaneously modelling the situation when these obligations would disappear, the position of the United States and Great Britain, Western and Eastern Europe, especially Poland, and the potential of the enslaved peoples of the USSR. According to nationalist theorists, since none of the states has yet openly declared support for Ukrainian statehood, the Ukrainian national liberation movement has no specific foreign policy orientation. At the same time, an international situation was modelled in which the Ukrainian issue is being actualised. A thesis characteristic of Ukrainian nationalism at the time of the end of the Second World War and the postwar period was proclaimed that it was in the foreign policy interest of Western countries to support the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the USSR. The article considers options for Poland's behaviour in the event of a war between the West and the USSR. The gradation of countries – potential allies of Ukraine in the international arena – was derived.

Key words: Myroslav Prokop, Mykhailo Palidovych, Ukrainian nationalism, foreign policy orientations, the Second World War.

Досліджено погляди представників української політичної думки націоналістичного спрямування М. Прокопа (псевдо В. Садовий) та М. Палідовича (псевдо Ю. Моряк) на предмет аналізу міжнародної ситуації у різні періоди 2-ї світової війни. З'ясовано оцінку сучасного стану та перспектив зовнішньої політики як великих держав – провідних суб'єктів міжнародних відносин, так і регіональних з позицій потенційної підтримки українського національно-визвольного руху, здійснену вищеназваними теоретиками. Міжнародну аналітику М. Прокопа та М. Палідовича розглянуто в контексті розвитку зовнішньополітичних орієнтирів українського націоналізму періоду 2-ї світової війни.

Констатовано, що М. Прокоп та М. Палідович у своїй аналітиці виділяли окремо Німеччину і СРСР як окупантів, країни, що мають союзницькі зобов'язання перед ними, моделюючи водночас ситуацію, коли ці зобов'язання зникнуть, окремо позицію США і Великобританії, країн Західної та Східної Європи, передусім Польщі, а також потенціал поневолених народів СРСР. На переконання теоретиків націоналізму, оскільки жодна з держав ще відкрито не заявила про підтримку української державності, тому в українського національно-визвольного руху немає конкретного зовнішньополітичного орієнтуру. Водночас моделювалася міжнародна ситуація, за якої українське питання актуалізується. Проголошувалася характерна для українського націоналізму часу завершення 2-ї світової війни та повоєнного періоду теза щодо відповідності зовнішньополітичному інтересові країн Заходу підтримки національно-визвольної боротьби народів СРСР. Розглядалися варіанти поведінки Польщі у випадку війни Заходу з СРСР. Виводилася градація країн – потенційних союзників України на міжнародній арені.

Ключові слова: Мирослав Прокоп, Михайло Палідович, український націоналізм, зовнішньополітичні орієнтири, 2-а світова війна.

Introduction. The current international realities associated with the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on 24 February 2022, have maximised the relevance of the legacy of Ukrainian nationalist theorists. The ideas and concepts of nationalist representatives of Ukrainian political thought, in particular regarding Ukraine's geopolitical

importance in the West-East confrontation, in deterring Moscow's aggression, and in establishing cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic-Black Sea region to prevent the implementation of Russia's imperial plans, are gaining new relevance and development today as never before.

Recent literature review. The works of M. Prokop and M. Palidovych on international issues of the Second World War have not yet been the subject of separate scientific studies. Therefore, there is a need for: 1) a multidimensional analysis of M. Prokop's and M. Palidovych's works of the Second World War; 2) a study of the works of the above-mentioned theorists in the context of the development of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and its adaptation to the international challenges of the wartime period.

The article main goal. The aim of the proposed study is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the international analytics of M. Prokop and M. Palidovych in the context of adaptation of foreign policy guidelines of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism to the transformation processes of the international system in different periods of the Second World War.

The main research material. In addition to the programme documents and resolutions of OUN conferences, the works and articles of individual nationalist leaders play an important role in shaping the foreign policy orientations of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The published works of Ukrainian nationalist theorists of the Second World War period demonstrate the foresight and professionalism of their international analytics.

First, let us consider the views of M. Prokop and M. Palidovych on the state and prospects of the Ukrainian national liberation movement in the middle phase of the Second World War. In his article «To the Basics of Our International Tactics», V. Sadovyi (the literary pseudonym of a prominent figure in the liberation movement, member of the OUN leadership, scholar and publicist Myroslav Prokop) analyses possible options for the Ukrainian liberation movement to seek external allies among the main actors in international relations in the military realities of the time. He considers Germany first. The author of the article, which was published in the second issue of 1943 of the central organ of the OUN leadership, the journal «Idea and Chyn», argues that Ukrainians took a decisive step towards equal cooperation with the Germans in 1941, which they brutally rejected, using their ideological mania for the superiority of their race and their mission in Eastern Europe. As for cooperation with the Great Britain, Sadovyi argues that at that time there was no place for the Ukrainian issue in British politics. According to the author of the article, it can be actualised under two conditions: «1) when the Bolshevyks lose, and

the British look for new heirs to the East; 2) when the Germans lose, and the Bolshevyks advance into Europe» [1, p. 23]. V. Sadovyi notes that England has never sought to consolidate the European continent. In its policy, it has always been guided by real European forces, which were also not interested in the unification and consolidation of Europe. Under such circumstances, could Ukrainian policy have been focused exclusively on England? No. But the Ukrainian liberation movement had to adhere to the *fait accompli* – to «seek a way out into the wider world». For the essence of the international policy of a stateless people is «to find consonant forces that are also interested in changing the existing state and to link them with common interests to their struggle for statehood» [1, p. 24].

The author of the article «One Front Towards the Future», which was published in the fifth issue of the magazine «Ideya and Chyn» in 1943, Y. Moryak (this was the pseudonym used by Mykhaylo Palidovych, an OUN ideologue, close associate of General Roman Shukhevych, editor-in-chief of the magazine «Ideya and Chyn») argues that in order to create an independent Ukrainian state, two main prerequisites must be fulfilled: 1) Ukrainians must create a national force that, under favourable conditions, will be able to implement this national idea – the creation of an independent Ukraine; 2) the appropriate international environment must be created [2, p. 11]. The author of the article also provides arguments that would contribute to the creation of an appropriate international environment favourable to the realisation of the main goal of the Ukrainian liberation movement. This situation, according to Yu. Moryak, will consist of two main elements. The first element is the exhaustion of the two main imperialist forces fighting for the occupation of Ukraine. First of all, this concerns Hitler's Germany. The Soviet army is also experiencing a certain amount of exhaustion. The second element is the growing contradictions between the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and Bolshevyk Russia, on the other. The source of contradictions between them is the ultimate military goals. Soviet Russia seeks to conquer and finally secure five-sixths of the globe through «revolutions and armed aggressions», while the United Kingdom is trying to «preserve and extend its colonial influence in world politics». On the other hand, American President F. Roosevelt sought to gain «political and economic supremacy of the United States in the world and the creation of a new security system» [2, pp. 11-12].

From the perspective of a modern researcher who knows the development of the international situation in the period after the Second World War, one cannot help but admire the insightful international analytics of the theorists of Ukrainian organised nationalism, little known to political science. After

all, the transformation processes of the international system were taking place at a kaleidoscopic speed, and any analysis of them required a deep knowledge of the trends in international relations and high professionalism to predict them.

Representatives of the Ukrainian national liberation movement were primarily interested in the trends in Anglo-Soviet relations. If we analyse the history of England, it has been trying for centuries to prevent the hegemony of any European state. The British government tried to maintain the so-called balance of power on the European continent and act as a kind of arbiter in European affairs. Therefore, it is obvious that «England would clearly not be interested in the emergence of the Kremlin leader Stalin on the European continent in Hitler's place.» [2, pp. 11-12]. In this context, it is worth quoting one of the quotes from the speech of the British Foreign Secretary during the Second World War, Anthony Eden, in the British Parliament, during which he spoke about the age-old principles of England's European policy, «which has never allowed any state in Europe to become hegemonic, even if it meant war» [3, p. 129].

Despite the pessimism of the international position on the Ukrainian issue as of 1943, further developments in international events, particularly on the military fronts, concealed, according to theorists of Ukrainian nationalism, certain prospects for creating more favourable foreign policy preconditions for the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state. At the same time, it should be noted that it was the interpretation of the USSR and Germany as invaders and disappointment with the pro-Russian position of the UK and the US that prompted S. Bandera's OUN to convene the Conference of the Enslaved Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia (November 1943) and to create the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples (ABN).

Even more interesting is the international analytics of the considered theorists of Ukrainian nationalism on the prospects of the Ukrainian national liberation movement at the final stage of the German-Soviet and the Second World War. After the obvious facts of Germany's imminent defeat in the war emerged, the Ukrainian liberation movement was most interested in how relations between the main actors of world politics – the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR – would develop in the future. Each of these states pursued its own interests, which gave rise to serious contradictions in relations between them. The contradictions between the USSR, on the one hand, and the UK and the US, on the other, were particularly acute.

In the new political confrontation (this time – diplomatic), which had all the prospects of escalating into the Third World War, the decisive factor, according to the author of the article «What's Next?» Yuriy Moryak, the decisive factor was to ensure that the ideas and concepts put forward by the United

Kingdom and the United States were in line with the interests of European peoples, in particular those of Eastern Europe. «It is clear that without the participation of the peoples enslaved by Red Moscow, each new war with Russia will end in the same way as Napoleon's campaign, the Entente intervention of the 1918-1920s, and the current German-Bolshevik campaign», Yuriy Moryak wrote in his article in the «Ideya and Chyn» magazine [4, p. 80]. In this statement, we can observe a thesis characteristic of Ukrainian nationalism at the time of the end of the Second World War and the postwar period that it was in the foreign policy interest of Western countries to support the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the USSR.

In his political report, delivered at the First Grand Assembly of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council (hereinafter UMLC) in July 1944, M. Prokop tried to outline the geopolitical situation in which Ukraine found itself on the eve of the end of the Second World War. He argued that Ukraine was not recognised as a subject of international relations, and its struggle for independence was not interpreted as a national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for their own state. It all boiled down to the fact that officially recognising the right of the Ukrainian people to fight for their statehood meant for any European country to violate its alliance commitments to one of the two main enemies of Ukrainian statehood during the Second World War – the USSR or Nazi Germany. Even those countries that suffered from the German occupation did not recognise the struggle of Ukrainians against the German occupiers to please the Soviet leadership, which was also engaged in an armed struggle against the Ukrainian liberation movement on Ukrainian territories.

However, according to M. Prokop, the international community had some interest in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their independence, based on the national interests of some individual countries. Based on the analysis of the foreign policy situation of the time, the author of the political report identifies five groups of countries in their attitude to the Ukrainian issue.

The first group is the USSR and Germany. Both actors in international relations are interested in maintaining their control over Ukrainian territories and seek to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian nation in the international arena. Therefore, the main task for Ukrainians abroad should be to objectively inform the world community about the actual state of affairs in the occupied Ukrainian territories and the desperate struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its statehood.

The second group is the occupied peoples of the East and West, who are more or less interested in the existence of the Ukrainian state. M. Prokop notes that we share a common goal with the occupied countries of Eastern Europe and Asia – the collapse of the Soviet

Union. And these countries should be as interested as possible in the emergence of an independent Ukraine, which could become the main actor in Central and Eastern Europe, around which all the peoples occupied by the USSR would unite and fight against the «encroachments of northern imperialism» [5, pp. 249-250].

In turn, we are united with the countries of Western Europe occupied by Germany in the anti-German struggle, and in the future we may be united in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. At the same time, M. Prokop identifies the main problems that hinder the proper cooperation of the Ukrainian national liberation movement with Western countries in the anti-German direction: First, the West's lack of awareness of the Ukrainian people's struggle for their statehood; second, Polish, Soviet, and German propaganda, which made European countries consider Ukrainians to be servants of Nazi Germany; third, the alliance obligations of European states with the USSR, which warns them against any contact with the Ukrainian liberation movement, let alone «its official recognition as one that fights for its statehood» [5, p. 250].

Within this second group of states, M. Prokop pays special attention to Germany's Balkan allies – Hungary and Romania, which are favourably disposed towards the Ukrainian liberation struggle. For Ukraine, these countries are of particular geopolitical importance. After all, Russian influence in the Balkans can cause serious problems for the Ukrainian state, especially in the time of active armed struggle for independence and recognition of its international legal personality. Therefore, these countries could easily fall under the sphere of political influence of the USSR due to their internal social problems, as well as their favourable attitude to Orthodox Russia.

M. Prokop includes Poland in the third group of states, which, like the Ukrainian people, was occupied by Nazi Germany. The Polish government in exile has launched extensive anti-Ukrainian propaganda among Western countries, and in Western Ukraine, according to the theorist of Ukrainian nationalism, it is actively fighting not against the Russian and German occupiers, but against the Ukrainian people. M. Prokop does not have high hopes for Polish-Ukrainian understanding, as Poles do not perceive Ukrainian statehood at the mental level. Therefore, as long as Poland makes its territorial claims to Ukrainian lands, it will be considered an enemy of Ukraine at the level of the USSR and Hitler's Germany. However, in the process of potentially forming an anti-Bolshevik bloc among European states, Poland will also join it and will be forced to recognise the independence of the Ukrainian state.

The fourth group of nations, according to M. Prokop, includes neutral states – Turkey and Finland – that are interested in creating an independent Ukraine. Turkey is interested in jointly opposing Russia's expansion

to the Black Sea and in the complete elimination of Russian influence in the Black Sea area. At the same time, according to M. Prokop, Turkey sees an independent Ukraine as a reliable deterrent to Russian aggression in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. Finland and Ukraine share common interests in «the collapse of the Russian Empire and the friendly traditions of the recent past» [5, p. 251].

The fifth group of states, according to M. Prokop, includes the USSR's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, in particular the United Kingdom, which, like the United States, shares a common anti-Hitler front with the USSR. Therefore, as long as J. Stalin continues the struggle against A. Hitler, the European group of states of the anti-Hitler coalition will be interested in cooperation with the USSR, and it will not be interested in any national liberation movements in the Soviet Union, including the Ukrainian issue. But as soon as J. Stalin changed his policy towards Hitler's Germany, the Allied powers, in particular Great Britain, would be interested in the collapse of the USSR and support for the Ukrainian liberation movement. M. Prokop argues that the UK will be extremely interested in Ukraine because of the latter's geopolitical position. After all, in addition to its human potential, the Ukrainian nation has an established powerful armed force in the form of the UPA. It is also worth paying special attention to the strategic importance of Ukrainian lands, from which it is best to attack Russia. M. Prokop emphasises that «the economic annexation of Ukraine is a big blow to Russia, and military-strategically, Ukrainian lands are the most favourable side from which to strike and deal a decisive blow to the Bolshevik empire» [5, pp. 251-253].

M. Prokop identifies three important factors that will influence the level of British support for Ukraine: the UK's cooperation with the White Guards, the Poles, and the German military [5, p. 254]. As for the White Guards, Britain's geopolitical interests in destroying all its imperialist rivals in Europe would prevail over its interests in cooperation with the latter. The issue of British cooperation with the Poles is more complicated. In the event of a war with the USSR, Poland's position among the Allies would be strengthened. Given the anti-Ukrainian position of Poland's ruling circles, it can be assumed that the Poles will be guided not by the national interests of their nation, but by «blind hatred» of the Ukrainian people and will promote the concept of Poland and Russia as the main and decisive actors in Eastern Europe at the cost of the Ukrainian issue. In other words, it will look like a new Andrusov Treaty. In this case, the Ukrainian issue could again become an internal affair between the historical enemies of the Ukrainian nation – Poland and Russia. And such a development should be considered very dangerous «given the poor knowledge of geography among the British and Americans» [5, p. 254].

In this case, Ukraine's position is further complicated by joint statements by Poles and Russians regarding Ukrainian «Germanophilia». Therefore, the Ukrainian liberation movement should make serious statements in this regard and inform the world community about the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the German occupiers. The most important task of Ukrainian diplomacy in the event of a war between the Western Allies and the USSR was to «free ourselves from the Polish-Russian «tutelage» and represent the will of the Ukrainian people» [5, p. 255].

Germany could again take a separate position in the event of a joint war with the Western coalition against the Soviet Union. M. Prokop suggests that claims to German influence in Eastern Europe could be renewed. In such a political scenario, the interests of the UK, Russia, Germany, Poland, and the United States of America would be intertwined in Ukraine.

Analysing the above-mentioned geopolitical situation, M. Prokop concludes that the Ukrainian people are in a situation where none of the states has yet openly declared support for Ukrainian statehood, so there is no specific foreign policy orientation.

Having studied the international situation of Ukraine at the end of the Second World War and the attitude of individual countries to the Ukrainian issue, M. Prokop draws the following conclusions:

1. All currently occupied European nations and great powers, with the exception of Germany, the USSR and Poland, are interested in the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people against German and Soviet imperialism;

2. The main obstacle to the recognition of the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people by other states is their allied obligations to Germany, and most importantly, to the USSR. Once such obligations are terminated, any obstacles to international recognition of Ukrainian statehood by other states and peoples will disappear;

3. Ukraine played a decisive role in the preparation and conduct of the revolution of the occupied peoples

in the USSR, which would lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a new order in Eastern Europe, given its crucial geopolitical position, high revolutionary readiness and organised armed forces;

4. Further development of current military and political events will lead to the actualisation of the Ukrainian issue in the international environment. But in any case, regardless of the foreign policy circumstances, the revolutionary forces, in particular the armed forces of the Ukrainian nation, will become «a decisive factor for gaining independent positions of Ukrainians in international relations and restoring Ukrainian statehood» [5, pp. 255-256].

Conclusion. Thus, M. Palidovych and M. Prokop assessed the current state and prospects of the foreign policy of both major powers – the leading actors in international relations, and regional ones from the perspective of potential support for the Ukrainian national liberation movement. They separately identified Germany and the USSR as occupiers, countries with allied obligations to them, while simulating a situation where these obligations would disappear, and the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as Western and Eastern European countries. As a problem, the lack of awareness of Western countries and societies about the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their statehood was noted.

It is difficult to refrain from admiring the professionalism and exhaustiveness of the scientific analysis of the status and possibilities of the Ukrainian issue in a specific, extremely complex and controversial international political situation, carried out by representatives of Ukrainian nationalist political thought. The views of the above-mentioned theorists demonstrate the multidimensionality of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism in terms of foreign policy orientations, and at the same time its flexibility and ability to adapt to the rapid transformation processes of the international system since the Second World War.

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