

**CONCEPTUAL FUNDAMENTALS AND DIRECTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA****КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНІ ЗАСАДИ ТА НАПРЯМКИ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ
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In the context of increasing turbulence in international relations, the positions of Asian countries, which have significant demographic, economic and military potential, are gaining significant importance. In particular, the value and weight of the geopolitical orientation of the Republic of India have significantly increased, especially in the context of the ambition of the PRC, as well as in the conflict between authoritarian regimes and countries of the democratic camp. Given this, the article is devoted to the analysis of the key fundamentals and directions of Indian foreign policy, that, in turn, will allow us to understand the prospects for its further development with a greater degree of probability.

In this study, the methodological basis is the approach of defining three concentric circles in the geopolitics of India: the countries of the South Asian region, neighboring states located in the Indo-Pacific region and the rest of the world. The features of New Delhi's policy in the South Asian region in the context of rivalry with China are analyzed. It is noted that New Delhi has been losing influence in the region in recent years, but meanwhile aims to take advantage of domestic political transformations in South Asian states to improve relations with them. The importance of the second circle is characterized by increased, especially in the context of countering Chinese influence. The priority of the third geographical circle is also analyzed with special attention focused on New Delhi's policy against the backdrop of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. It is emphasized that during the premiership of N. Modi, the priority of the goal of consolidating India's status as a world power has increased.

The prism for analyzing Indian policy by geographical circles was its conceptual foundations: the principles of Gandhinism and «Pancha Shila», the Gujral doctrine, the policies of «Neighbors First» and «Act East», the principle of «strategic autonomy», the «Diamond Necklace» strategy, the concepts of «one world» and Vishvaguru. Separately, the negative effects of the implementation of the ideas of «Hindutva» in India's foreign policy are noted.

Key words: the Republic of India, Indian foreign policy, conceptual fundamentals, Indo-Chinese rivalry, South Asia, «Hindutva».

В умовах зростання турбулентності міжнародних відносин значної ваги набувають позиції країн азіяського простору, які володіють суттєвим демографічним, економічним та військовим потенціалом. Зокрема, значно зросла цінність та вага геополітичної орієнтації Республіки Індія, особливо у контексті геополітичних амбіцій КНР, а також конфліктогенності між авторитарними режимами та країнами демократичного табору. Зважаючи на це, стаття присвячена аналізу ключових засад та напрямків індійської зовнішньої політики, що, у свою чергу, дозволить із більшим ступенем ймовірності зрозуміти перспективи її подальшого розвитку.

У даному дослідженні за методологічну основу взято підхід визначення трьох концентричних кіл у геополітиці Індії: країни регіону Південної Азії, сусідні держави, що розміщуються в Індо-Тихокеанській акваторії та решта країн світу. Проаналізовано особливості політики Нью-Делі у регіоні Південної Азії у контексті суперництва із Китаєм. Відмічено про те, що Нью-Делі протягом останніх років втрачає вплив у регіоні, але водночас прагне скористатися внутрішньополітичними трансформаціями у південноазійських державах для налагодження взаємин.

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Проаналізовано пріоритетність третього географічного кола, у рамках якого особливу увагу загострено на політиці Нью-Делі на тлі повномасштабної російсько-української війни. Підкреслено, що за прем'єрства Н. Моді зросла пріоритетність мети закріплення за Індією статусу світової потуги.

Призмом для аналізу індійської політики за географічними колами стали її концептуальні засади: принципи гандизму та Панча Шили, доктрина Гуджрала, політики «Сусіди перш за все» та «Діяти на Сході», принцип «стратегічної автономності», стратегія «Діамантового намиста», концепції «єдиного світу» та Вішвагурю. Окремо відзначено про негативні ефекти від реалізації ідей «хіндутви» у зовнішній політиці Індії.

Ключові слова: Республіка Індія, зовнішня політика Індії, концептуальні засади, індо-китайське суперництво, Південна Азія, «хіндутва».

Introduction. In the 21st century, the system of international relations is going through a period of fundamental changes. To a large extent, these transformations stem from a change in the balance of power between global powers, where Western countries are increasingly losing their leading positions in world politics. Instead, the potential of the countries of the Global South is growing, among which the Asian states are the ones that have shown the greatest increase in geopolitical power. Of course, in this context, China comes to mind first, but alongside it, another Asian power which has the potential to balance Beijing's ambitions – the Republic of India (RI).

It should be taken into account India's growing importance in terms of its ability to influence the further transformation of the system of international relations, because in case of a severe escalation between Western countries and authoritarian revisionist regimes this confrontation will largely be determined on whose side New Delhi will be on. Therefore Indian foreign policy is becoming a permanent subject of interest both for the political elites of the world's leading countries and the global scientific community.

Recent literature review. So, the foreign policy of the RI is systematically the object of close attention from researchers, both domestic and foreign. In particular, among the works of domestic scientists, it should be noted the analytical report of the employees of the National Institute for Strategic Studies «The Republic of India: a growing power. Prospects for the development of Ukrainian-Indian relations» [6], where the authors consider the India's potential of the power, its relations with key international actors and pay special attention to Ukrainian-Indian relations.

The works of O. Bordilovska are systematically devoted to the study of the features of India's foreign policy, in particular, to the analysis of the potential of New Delhi as a mediator in ending the Russian-Ukrainian war [23]. In general, against the backdrop of a full-scale Kremlin aggression, domestic researchers are increasingly analyzing India's position and policy in this context. However, other aspects of the foreign policy of the RI are also in focus of Ukrainian scientific research. For example, N. Gorodnya examines the transformation of India's «Act East» policy [19], O. Lukash and I. Tykhonenko analyze the influence of civilizational factors on India's foreign policy [26], O. Telenko characterizes India's «soft power» tools [30].

Among foreign researchers whose works were used in this study, it is worth noting such articles: of Ha D. Thanh devoted to the features of the «Neighborhood first policy» policy during the premiership of N. Modi [9], of Das P. on the Indian «Diamond Necklace» strategy in countering the growing influence of China and I.Hall's [18] analysis of the features of India's religious diplomacy [29]. Along with this, it should be noted the analytical intelligence of E. Anbarasan [3; 14] and D.Brewster [12], which permanently cover various aspects of India's foreign policy and the situation in South Asia (SA).

The purpose of this study is to analyze the key conceptual fundamentals and directions of Indian foreign policy, which will allow to improve our understanding of its determinants and priorities, as well as to enhance the quality of forecasting India's behavior in the international arena.

The main research material. Territorial disputes have been the determinants and important directions of India's foreign policy since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1947. Of course, the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the Kashmir region comes first. Along with it, the conflict potential does not disappear in the territorial disputes between India and the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

Indo-Chinese disputes occasionally lead to hand-to-hand clashes between the military personnel of the two countries. The most recent large-scale incident of such nature was recorded in 2020 [1]. However, it should be emphasized that the clashes occur without the use of firearms. It indicates the unwillingness of the sides to lead the disputes to a full-scale conflict. Meanwhile, the sides are systematically increasing their military and logistical capabilities on the border.

Nevertheless, the clashes of 2020 led to a significant deterioration in bilateral relations, what was manifested even in the ban on Chinese apps in India [2]. The improvement of relations occurred in 2024-2025, where was particularly indicative the visit of Indian Prime Minister N. Modi to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, which was held in August-September in China [3;4].

It is interesting that the improvement of relations between New Delhi and Beijing was facilitated by the peculiarities of the US policy towards India during the second term of the presidency of D. Trump, especially the imposition of 50 % tariffs on Indian

goods in late summer 2025 in connection with New Delhi's large-scale purchase of Russian oil against the backdrop of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war [5]. This prompted the Indian leadership to improve relations with the PRC.

However, the Chinese factor in India's geopolitics is not limited by border territorial disputes, but also manifests itself in other dimensions, especially in the context of New Delhi's policy in the South Asia region (SAR), what will be discussed later.

Considering the importance of SA in India's foreign policy, it should be noted three geographical concentric circles of its geopolitics: «immediate neighborhood» (South Asia), «extended neighborhood» (most countries of the Indo-Pacific region) and the rest of the world. In fact, in the first geographical circle New Delhi seeks to consolidate the role of a hegemon, which has the right to prevent third-party interference in the course of regional processes. Within the second circle, India focuses on balancing the influence of other players in context of realizing its own national interests. Finally, within the third circle, New Delhi aims to obtain the status of a global player [6, c. 13].

Thus, the SAR from the point of view of India's geopolitics is the sphere of its dominance. This position is based on India's absolute superiority in demographic, military and economic potential over neighboring countries. The importance of SA in India's geopolitics is evidenced by other aspects of the conceptual foundations of its foreign policy. In particular, it is worth recalling the Gujral doctrine (1996) on the foundations of relations with neighbors. It provides five principles of India's interaction with the countries of SA, but with the exception of Pakistan. Analysts emphasize that this doctrine is aimed at improving relations with small neighboring states by relying on the principle of positive asymmetry. It means that New Delhi declares a refusal to use its potential to influence the countries of the region in exchange for their denial to take actions that could pose a threat to India's national security [7, c. 80].

The logical continuation of the priority of the SAR is the policy «Neighbors First» (2008), that again emphasizes the goal of improving contacts with neighboring countries (including Pakistan, Afghanistan and Myanmar) [8]. Under the premiership of N. Modi, this policy received a new impetus with a delineation of its key principles: the desire and readiness of New Delhi to give special political priority to neighboring countries and island states in the Indian Ocean; India's readiness, if necessary, to provide support to neighboring countries in matters of resources, equipment and training; strengthening the level of integration and the level of contacts for the free movement of goods, people, energy, capital and information; New Delhi's promotion of a model of regionalism that will be relevant for neighboring countries [9, c. 387].

Nonetheless, despite aspirations, the RI did not manage to consolidate its leadership status in the SAR. In particular, a significant obstacle is the presence of permanent conflict with Pakistan. It is also worth adding the inconsistency of New Delhi's policy and fears on the part of small and medium-sized countries in the region. These points ultimately did not allow to achieve long-term results in the issue of regional leadership.

Today, the closest regional partner is only the mountainous Kingdom of Bhutan. It should be noted that, in accordance with bilateral agreements, India will provide support to Thimphu in the event of an external threat [10]. The determinant of Bhutan's geopolitical proximity to India is the territorial claims made by Beijing, which even lead to Indo-Chinese border clashes, as it happened in 2017 [11].

However, in general, the RI continues to lose its positions in the region. In this context, a telling example is the Republic of Maldives, where during the last presidential elections in 2023, the pro-Chinese politician M. Muizzu won, using the slogan «India Out» as a basis his election campaign [12].

Therefore, both the Maldives and other small and medium-sized countries in the region, such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh, are increasingly promoting cooperation with China, considering it as a counterweight to India's regional ambitions. While, Beijing is actively using the «debt trap» policy, which leads to the strengthening of its influence (the most striking example is that the Sri Lankan authorities leasing the Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned company in 2017 due to inability to service loans) [13].

Resent political changes in Bangladesh have also had negative effects on India's regional ambitions. In 2024, mass protests against corruption and dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation led to the ouster of pro-Indian Prime Minister Sh. Hasina, who is currently in hiding in India despite demands from Dhaka to extradite her. Moreover, 2025 was marked by an outbreak of anti-Indian protests in Bangladesh and the murder of a Hindu. This led to significant tensions in bilateral relations [14]. Meanwhile, Beijing immediately focuses on strengthening its influence in this country by intensifying a number of areas of bilateral cooperation [15].

However, New Delhi, in turn, also tries to take advantage of domestic political processes in other countries of SA to strengthen its influence. Thus, in 2022, as a result of a mass anti-government movement caused by an acute socio-economic crisis, the pro-Chinese president G. Rajapaksa was removed from power on the island. India also tried to use this situation to reestablish relations with Male, in particular, by providing financial and humanitarian assistance [16]. A similar approach can be observed towards to Nepal, where in September 2025 an unprecedented

event in political history took place – the so-called «Revolution Z», during which Nepalese youth without any political identification removed the pro-Chinese government of Sh. Oli from power [17].

Indian experts describe the China's growing influence in the region as the formation of a «geopolitical vice» for New Delhi. However, India takes action to balance the PRC within the framework of the so-called «Diamond Necklace» – counter-strategy, which involves strengthening its own position in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea by implementing agreements with Iran, Oman, Kenya, Seychelles to build dual-purpose seaports on their territory, strengthening military infrastructure on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and reaching agreements with Singapore and Indonesia to allow the deployment of surface and submarine fleets at the Changi and Sabang bases, respectively [18, c. 553-554].

Other aspects of the «Diamond Necklace» are the desire to develop cooperation with the Central Asian countries and Mongolia, as well as with Japan directly and with the countries participating in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which, in addition to New Delhi and Tokyo, also includes Washington and Canberra. As a result, India's activities within the framework of the «Diamond Necklace» strategy form a network of cooperation that directly surrounds China and its activities towards the implementation of the «String of Pearls» strategy (development of maritime infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region) and the «One Belt, One Road».

Along with this, under N. Modi, the priority of relations with Southeast Asia (SEA) and East Asia (EA) has also increased. It is evidenced by the transformation from «Look East» to «Act East» policy. The «Look East» policy was launched in 1992 and aimed to intensify trade and economic contacts with the countries of SEA. With the coming to power of N. Modi in 2014, this vector was named «Act East» and this step emphasized the desire to achieve concrete results in the issue of cooperation not only with the countries of SEA, but also with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia [19, c. 277].

Meanwhile, it is worth emphasizing that the rivalry between India and the PRC is one of the important elements of a broader geopolitical game, the participants of which also include the USA, the countries of the collective West and Russia. So, we are talking about the third geographical circle of India's geopolitics. In this game, New Delhi is increasingly promoting itself as one of the centers of geopolitical gravity, which can act as an alternative to the growth of the global influence of China.

In particular, in this context, India also intends to displace China from the role of the world's factory, strives to attract as much Western investment as possible and transfer the production capacities of transnational companies to its territories, using the factors

of cheap labor and complicating relations between Western countries and Beijing. In this context, it should be noted that the Indian leadership declares the priority of economic goals in the implementation of foreign policy. We must also admit that the successes of New Delhi's economic development since the end of the 20th century allowed it to become the fourth largest economy in the world and at the same time serve as a weighty basis for claims to the status of a world power. By the way, the US is actively making efforts in order that New Delhi outlines an anti-Chinese position, especially amid the background of growing US-Chinese rivalry. It is noteworthy that Moscow also sees India as a certain balancer for China's ambitions.

However, in this context, it is worth returning to the features of the development of India's relations with Moscow and Washington, in particular, during the Cold War. Thus, formally New Delhi declared neutrality during the period of bipolar confrontation, which was emphasized by India's active participation in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. It should be noted that India has sought to secure a leadership role from the very beginning of this movement. It is also worth recalling that at the Bandung Conference (1955, Indonesia), which was important for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, the countries of Asia and Africa in the final document recorded the «Pancha Shilla» – five principles of peaceful coexistence (mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefits; peaceful coexistence), which were first announced in the Indo-Chinese Treaty of 1954. Subsequently, New Delhi systematically emphasizes its commitment to using the principles of «Pancha Shilla» in building relations with countries around the world. By the way, New Delhi, given its active participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, also strives to position itself today as the leader of the countries of the so-called Global South.

However, in practice, India's non-aligned approach was somewhat modified, namely towards actively developing cooperation with the USSR. So, during the Cold War, New Delhi received significant support from the Kremlin in various aspects, from training students to supplying weapons and providing diplomatic support in the confrontation with Pakistan. It is worth noting that in the post-bipolar period, military-technical cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow has deepened, as a result of which the Indian army is 60% dependent on Russian supplies for military-technical support, according to the most conservative estimates. In turn, the long period of cooperation since the Cold War and anti-colonial sentiments have become key determinants of India's pro-Russian neutrality in the context of the Kremlin's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine.

Today, India, along with China, are the largest buyers of Russian oil at a reduced price, which in total is a key source of financing for the Kremlin's war against Ukraine. Thus, since the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, trade between New Delhi and Moscow has increased by as much as 430% – from \$13 billion per year to \$69 billion [20]. Moreover, according to one of the world's leading financial information resources (Bloomberg), India is the second largest supplier of dual-use products to the Kremlin [21].

As for Washington, relations with it during the Cold War were generally not very friendly, especially since 1971, when Indo-Soviet cooperation was reinforced by the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, and there was also close cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. In the post-bipolar period, the development of Indian nuclear weapons became a point of tension. However, the growth of power and, accordingly, the level of threat from the PRC led to a rapprochement between the parties, as evidenced by India's entry into QUAD.

Today, India considers the United States as a key partner in containing China's ambitions. However, in this geopolitical game, New Delhi aims to pursue a pragmatic policy, which is often characterized by the concept of «strategic autonomy», about the inadmissibility of a situation where India is drawn into the US-China rivalry, as this will harm the pace of its economic development and threaten national security [6, c.16]. In turn, Washington, both by establishing economic, technological and military-technical cooperation, strives to strengthen New Delhi's anti-Chinese position and weaken large-scale support for the Kremlin through economic cooperation. Interestingly, the deepening of cooperation with the US and other Western countries prompted that India does not support the idea of the BRICS format acquiring a hard anti-Western orientation, which would correspond to the interests of Beijing and Moscow.

Along with this, Western countries want New Delhi to also demonstrate an anti-Russian position. Therefore, the value of India in the modern geopolitical game has increased significantly. It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian leadership hoped that India could become a significant mediator in the issue of ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. This view was supported by a significant improvement in diplomatic relations between the two countries, which was manifested in the first visit of the Indian leader to Ukraine in August 2024 since the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations [22]. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the visit to Ukraine took place somewhat later than the Indian Prime Minister visited Moscow in July of the same year. It is also worth adding that a wide range of experts believe that one should hardly hope for an active mediating role for India in ending the Russian-Ukrainian war [23].

However, D. Trump's «tariff policy» led not only to the easing of Indian-Chinese tensions, but also to

the improvement of Indian-Russian relations. Thus, in early December 2025, V. Putin's official visit to India took place, during which the sides signed a number of documents on deepening bilateral cooperation [24]. Moreover, at the end of December 2025, the Indian private company «Reliance» resumed purchases of Russian oil after being suspended after Washington imposed sanctions on «Rosneft» and «Lukoil» in October 2025 [25].

Finally, it is impossible not to notice that, along with geopolitical calculations, religious and civilizational factors play a significant role in India's foreign policy. In particular, it is worth recalling the specific strategy of achieving political goals by non-violent methods called «Satyagraha», implemented by the most prominent figure of India on the path to independence, M. Gandhi. The idea of «Satyagraha», in turn, flows from one of the cornerstone principles of Hinduism – «ahimsa», which involves not causing harm to any living being. Gandhi's approach was also significantly extrapolated to the sphere of foreign relations of the already independent India. In particular, this includes the previously mentioned principles of «Panch Shil», a special emphasis on the non-use of force in international relations, the declaration of the concepts of «one world» (the vision that no country has any reason to rule the world, no matter how powerful it is) and «unity in diversity» [26, c.158]. We can also add here the statements of the Indian leadership regarding the peaceful way to end the Russian-Ukrainian war.

However, along with this, the BJP party led by Prime Minister N. Modi promotes the ideology of «Hindutva» (the development of India on the basis of religious and cultural nationalism based on Hinduism) as the cornerstone of state building, which is also reflected in foreign policy. To promote «Hindutva», «enemies» are needed to mobilize and increase the level of loyalty in Indian society. Pakistan, first of all, plays this role.

Thus, Modi's premiership was marked by increased confrontation in relations with Pakistan: air battles in early 2019 due to a suicide attack on an Indian army convoy in Kashmir; the same year, the special autonomous status of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir was abolished; in 2025, a several-day military confrontation between the sides using aircraft, missiles, drones, and artillery due to the massacre of Indian tourists in the New Delhi-controlled part of Kashmir by pro-Pakistani groups [27]. Fortunately, however, the sides do not intend to escalate to a full-scale war, in which the unofficial nuclear status of both states plays not the least role.

Besides, in some places, rhetoric within the framework of the ideology of «Hindutva» leads to negative consequences in relations with a significant number of Muslim countries. A striking illustration of this is the fallout from the comments made by the then BJP speaker N. Sharma regarding the Prophet Muham-

mad, which the Muslim community identified as offensive and islamophobic. Moreover, there was an official strong reaction from a number of states with a predominant Muslim population (for example, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Oman and Iraq), which left a negative mark on India's relations with the countries of the Muslim world [28].

However, there is an appeal to more positive narratives generated by Hinduism, for example, the idea that India will become a world or universal guru (Vishvaguru) who will lead the world to peace and mutual respect [29, c. 2].

Another direction of using «Hindutva» is the popularization of own cultural and civilizational heritage to improve India's international image, that is, to strengthen the use of soft power in foreign policy. In particular, among the achievements in this direction is the approval at the UN level of the International Yoga Day in 2014 (June 21). Generally, it is characterized by using a wide range of «soft power» tools, including the above-mentioned concepts of foreign policy (ideas of Gandhi and «Pancha Shila»), the popularization of world-famous literary works (the epics of Ramayana and Mahabharata), products of national cinema, the study of Hindi and even some sports (cricket) [30, c. 419-421].

Conclusion. In the foreign policy of the RI, three geographical circles are distinguished: neighboring countries of the SAR, neighboring countries located in the Indo-Pacific region and the rest of the world. It is significant that within the first circle, which plays an extremely important role for Indian geopolitics and security, New Delhi sees itself as a dominant power. In the conceptual dimension, New Delhi's ambitions are underlined by a number of theoretical principles, in particular, the Gujral doctrine and the «Neighbors First» policy. In practice, relations with the countries of SA occupy a significant place in the system of priorities of New Delhi. However, significant obstacles to the realization of regional leadership ambitions are the inconsistency of policy, the negative perception of Indian claims by small and medium-sized countries in the region, the permanent conflict with Pakistan, as well as the growing influence of the PRC, Islamabad's geopolitical partner, in the region.

China strives to narrow the geopolitical influence of the RI by developing, first of all, economic cooperation with the countries of the region. Currently,

the closest regional ally for New Delhi is Bhutan, but during 2023–2025, India's relations with the Maldives and Bangladesh significantly deteriorated. Meanwhile, the RI is trying to succumb to political developments in Nepal and Sri Lanka and weaken Beijing's influence on them.

Along with this, in order to weaken the geopolitical positions of the PRC, India is implementing the «Diamond Necklace» counter-strategy. This emphasizes the growing importance of the second circle of geopolitics of the RI. This is also reinforced by the transformation of the «Look East» policy to «Act East».

At the same time, relations with China are part of the already global dimension, where New Delhi aims to consolidate the status of a geopolitical center of power. In context of relations with the PRC and the USA India adheres to the approach of «strategic autonomy». This approach remains relevant for India, especially considering that the international positions and value of the RI have grown too much. In particular, New Delhi is implementing this approach in the context of increasing cooperation with the Kremlin against the background of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular, emphasizing the independence of its foreign policy course amid the background of the demands and pressure of the West to stop cooperation with Moscow. Thus, there is little hope for the positive role of the RI as a mediator in ending the war, especially as a state that will support Ukraine. Additionally, the use of the factor of cheap Russian oil fits into another direction of the RI policy – the priority of gaining economic development goals, where New Delhi aims to achieve the level of economic success of the PRC in the future. Nevertheless, the RI de facto acts as one of the key sponsors of the Kremlin's war against Ukraine.

While, India's foreign policy contains a number of conceptual principles that are distinguished by a commitment to peace and, accordingly, are aimed at improving its international image, for example, the ideas of Gandhism, the principles of «Panch Shila», «one world», positioning itself as a Vishvaguru. These concepts are supported by increasing the use of various soft power instruments. However, the implementation of the idea of «Hinduism» leads to increased conflict not only with Pakistan, but sometimes to an aggravation of tensions with a wide range of countries of the Muslim world.

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